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I. Introduction 
A well-established observation is that since the early 1980s, the organization of work has changed 
considerably, generally toward greater decentralization of decision-making and reliance on financial 
incentives (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994, Appelbaum et al., 2000, Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001). Improved 
educational attainments may have facilitated decentralization of decision-making, as did computerization 
(Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001, Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003, Bartel, Ichniowski, Shaw, 2005); new 
technologies may have required greater reliance on employee decision-making (Ben-Ner et al., 2000, 
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002), and the success of Japanese organizational practices and their 
popularization by the media and academics, plus the concomitant academic research into new forms of 
organizing work, may have also contributed to the introduction of employee participation in financial 
rewards and decision-making. Whatever the reasons for these changes, the process of transformation has 
not been instantaneous; rather, firms adopted and shed practices at an uneven pace. Some researchers 
commented on why the adoption of useful organizational innovations may be delayed, such as that “old 
dogs” take longer to learn “new tricks” (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995, Prendergast and Stole, 1996), but 
most of the literature focuses on why firms have certain human resource practices and how these practices 
affect performance (see, for example, Osterman, 1994, Jones and Kato, 1995, Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Pernushi, 1997, Cappelli and Neumark, 2001, Bloom, Kretschmer and Van Reenen, 2006), rather than on 
the process through which they come to adopt those practices. Differences in practices among similar firms 
situated in similar circumstances at a particular point in time are typically attributed to managers’ 
optimization errors, suggesting that some firms are outside equilibrium.1  But the question of whether and 
how these errors are ever corrected is rarely asked, and in the literature on human resource practices it has 
never been answered. Finding out whether firms make corrections requires an examination of the dynamics 
of human resource practices, and finding out how they make the corrections requires an investigation into 
the information and signals managers use and how long it takes them to translate this information into 
adjustments of human resource practices. In short, it requires a study of how firms behave outside 
equilibrium, that is, what they learn from their experience and from other sources and how they put into 
action what they have learned. This is what we set out to understand in this paper. We study learning in the 
context of human resource practices with the goal of enriching our understanding of organizational learning 
in general and in the specific context of human resources. 
In this paper, we investigate an original and unique dataset to test several theoretical hypotheses 
about ways in which firms learn how to adjust the structure of their workplace. We study the dynamics of 
year-to-year choices made by our sample firms in order to understand what determines the adoption of 
                                                 
1 Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) discuss this issue when they investigate empirically the determinants of firms’ choice of the mix of 
skilled labor, IT capital, and specific workplace organization practices. 
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human resource practices across space and time, emphasizing the notion of learning.2 We envision the 
process of choice as an executive decision based on what management knows about its own organization 
and about human resource practices in general. Management’s information about both internal resources 
and the added value of different practices is incomplete, especially during times of change and as new 
techniques emerge, and therefore learning is central to the process of making decisions. Managers need to 
learn about their firms’ organizational needs, options, and capabilities before making decisions on whether 
to change their firms’ human resource practices, and, if change is indicated, what changes to implement.  
Learning is not directly observable. Learning may be investigated by comparing the outcomes of an 
experimental group assigned to a learning treatment with the outcomes of a control group (as it is done, for 
example, in the job training literature). This approach is not feasible in many learning situations, including 
those of organizational learning; instead, researchers make inferences about learning by studying the 
relationship between its hypothesized determinants and its consequences through a latent variable approach. 
We develop a framework that identifies the informational determinants of learning and relates them to 
organizational choices and economic outcomes and then test for the significance of the determinants and 
outcomes. Following the established literature, we identify: (a) the effects of learning-by-doing through the 
effects of experience on performance, and additionally on choice of human resource systems, (b) the effects 
of matching between firm capabilities and organizational needs through the effects of changes in 
performance on choice of system, and (c) the effects of social learning through the influence of a firm’s 
geographic location and industry-level variables on choice of systems. Our paper is similar to a certain 
degree to the literature that looks at the determinants of adoption of human resource system and its effect 
on performance. However, the key difference lies in the fact that the literature on determinants and 
consequences investigates behavior in equilibrium, whereas we study dynamic out-of-equilibrium behavior 
and emphasize learning related variables. This is the first paper to evaluate a wide spectrum of variables 
that influence learning, as well as firm characteristics, and to consider the adoption of human resource 
practices and their effects on performance from the perspective of learning. 
In the middle of the 1990s, we surveyed all publicly-traded and a sample of privately-held  
Minnesota based firms, asking them to provide the dates of introduction of various human resource 
practices concerning the group and firm-level decision-making and financial incentives. Following much of 
the literature, we combined individual practices into systems (sometimes referred to as bundles). Figure 1 
documents the significant decline in the proportion of firms with a traditional system of human resources—
i.e., a system that combines centralized decision-making with fixed pay. The figure focuses on the publicly-
                                                 
2 We are taking our cues from Besley and Case (1993), p. 396, who write: “We are interested in understanding what determines adoption of the 
technology across space and time.” The related but separate question of how organizational innovations are diffused through a population of firms is 
not investigated in this paper. 
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traded firms, but the picture is very similar when the privately-held firms are included.3 It also documents 
the rise in the proportion of firms that have a group-oriented financial incentives system or a high-
performance system that combines decentralized decision-making and financial incentives. The figure 
reflects the cumulative result of the choices made by each sample firm over time of whether to continue 
with its current human resources system or switch to another system. Table 1 summarizes these choices 
annually and shows the disposition of the 855 annual decisions that were made by the sample of publicly-
traded firms between 1980 and 1994. A majority of the firms (72.7%) had changed systems during the 
period under consideration, with some firms undergoing more than one change, for a total of 83 system 
changes. Most transitions were from the traditional system into the financial incentives system, and from 
the financial incentives system into the high-performance system. Our empirical investigation examines 
these choices relative to various signals and information that management may have received prior to 
making these decisions in order to infer about the process and nature of learning. 
Our empirical investigation of the learning process is guided by the learning and technological 
diffusion literatures, as well as by what we have learned from human resources professionals.4 Human 
resource executives tell a multilayered story, which seems to vary with firm size, location, and fortunes, as 
well as idiosyncratic factors such as the personalities of key executives. The initiative for organizational 
change often comes from CEOs who are either unhappy with performance and want to shake up the 
organization or even transform it, or on the contrary, feel that the company is doing so well that it can 
experiment and take risks with new ideas. Some human resource executives take a strategic view of the 
organization and are constantly looking for new ideas; they are generally well-connected to their peers and 
participate in high-level professional meetings with consultants and academics, sometimes as speakers 
relating their firms’ experiences. Some human resource departments, particularly in large firms, have 
employees with graduate degrees who attend professional conferences and read the professional literature. 
These employees constitute an internal consulting group that executives can consult in addition to external 
consultants. In other firms, the human resource employees and executives concentrate on day-to-day 
functions and have few opportunities to engage in strategic thinking. Most executives tell about “resistance 
to change,” the familiar phenomenon whereby those who anticipate losing from a change oppose it and 
resist it if they can, and thereby slow the speed of system change. 
Executives’ accounts of the processes that lead to change or continuity in their firms’ human 
resource systems share some of the central elements represented in the economic literature on learning 
(e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995, 1996, Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995, Ericsson and Pakes, 1998, Cabral 
                                                 
3 For coherence of presentation and completeness of analysis, we focus the presentation of our findings on the subsample of publicly-traded firms 
for which financial data are available. Such data are required for testing the matching hypothesis as well as for analyzing the effects of learning on 
firm performance. Whenever the analysis did not require the use of financial performance, we replicated the estimations for the full sample of firms. 
The main results are shown in Appendix Table 2.  
4 As professors of human resources and industrial relations, we have had numerous interactions with human resources professionals. One of us has 
belonged for a long time to a membership organization of human resource executives in medium and large-sized organizations created to facilitate 
networking and learning. 
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and Leiblein, 2001, and Munshi, 2004). This literature studies various forms of learning, often in the 
context of the suitability of a technology for deployment in an organization, and emphasizes the dynamic 
process as it unfolds over time. The three dominant theoretical approaches include the familiar learning-by-
doing theory, whereby decision-makers learn from their experience to improve their ability to operate a 
system; the matching theory, according to which decision-makers extract information about their firm’s 
capabilities for suitability with what is needed to operate a particular system; and the social learning theory, 
which suggests that decision-makers learn from observing the behavior of others.  
We build on these theories and on practitioners’ insights to investigate possible influences on 
changes that firms made in their human resource systems. The ambit of our investigation is broader than 
that of other studies of learning, in that we approach the question of how firms learn from a broad 
conceptual perspective, allowing for the possibility that firms may learn in multiple ways and from diverse 
sources, and our rich dataset allows us to investigate multiple ways and sources of learning. We evaluate 
whether experience with a particular system tends to deepen a firm’s commitment to that system or 
facilitates its transition to more complex systems, and examine how firm performance evolves with 
accumulated experience with a system, both key predictions of learning-by-doing. We also investigate how 
firms use information about their own performance to inform their choices of human resource systems, a 
prediction of learning from the matching theory literature. Furthermore, in relation to the social learning 
literature, we study whether information about the behavior of other firms, possibilities of networking, and 
geographic location influence a firm’s choice of human resource systems. Finally, we examine the effect of 
factors such as firm age, size, and geographic location on the speed of learning and adoption of human 
resource systems.  
Our principal dataset is rich, containing 110 publicly-traded firms over a period of up to 15 years. 
The fact that we use data on firms from a single state removes some of the heterogeneity found in large 
national datasets. The relatively small sample size may generate imprecise findings, which makes it harder 
not to reject the null hypothesis of zero effects. The finding of systematic effects would therefore suggest 
that the learning processes that we uncover in this paper have a significant impact on firms’ behavior. The 
paper contributes to the theory of organizational learning by developing a conceptual framework that 
allows us to combine different modes of learning and test empirically the importance of different factors for 
learning about human resource systems. Our findings suggest a multifaceted learning process. Learning-by-
doing leads firms to stay with their current system for a few years until their accumulated experience is 
large enough to implement and be more productive with a more complex system. It takes about 12 years for 
a firm with a traditional system to transition to the high-performance system whereas firms with the 
decision-making or financial incentive systems wait only about 3 years to switch to the more complex 
system. Firms’ recent performance tends to be used as a signal of whether they should switch systems, in an 
expected fashion: decline in performance is associated with a lower likelihood of taking up a more complex 
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system, whereas improvement in performance is associated with a greater tendency to move to a more 
complex system. Finally, firms learn from their peers and others, and we find a significant influence from 
what and how others behave on a firm’s decision to adjust its system. Different learning mechanisms work 
in a complementary fashion, and their influence varies with the nature of the transition. Firms seem to move 
from the traditional system into the high-performance system in two stages: first they move into an 
intermediate system (decision-making or financial incentives) on the basis of social learning as well as 
some confirmation that they have the requisite organizational capabilities, and second, they transition from 
an intermediate system to the full high-performance system on the basis of stronger confirmation of their 
organizational capabilities and information about desirable performance by firms with the high-
performance system. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we develop the conceptual 
framework for studying learning by organizations and offer the main hypotheses. In section III, we describe 
the data, and in section IV, we put forth our analytical framework and empirical strategy. The results are 
described in section V, and in section VI, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications of 
our findings for the understanding of learning by organizations as well as for further research. 
 
II. Learning by Organizations: A Conceptual Framework 
 
The organization that succeeds in extracting better, smarter, and more economical effort from its 
employees will, ceteris paribus, perform better than other organizations. To accomplish this, a certain set of 
human resource practices must be put in place relative to an organization’s specific needs and capabilities. 
However, managers do not always know how to accomplish that because (a) they do not fully know their 
organizations’ capabilities, (b) those capabilities may not be sufficient relative to organizational needs, (c) 
managers have only an imperfect understanding of the options available to their organization, (d) they may 
not know what works best for their organization, and (e) the environment changes continuously, so what 
worked well yesterday may not work as well tomorrow. As a result, how an organization manages its affairs 
has to be evaluated frequently in response to new understandings and new information. Because the payoff 
for doing things right in a competitive environment is high, and the penalty for doing things wrong is 
severe, organizations have an incentive to learn how to do things right. This is the basis of the economic 
approach to learning.  
Three different approaches to learning have been developed in the literature, although it is plausible 
that an individual or a group may engage in more than one form of learning. The first approach emphasizes 
the accumulation of capabilities through experience; this is the learning-by-doing theory. The second 
approach focuses on the accumulation of information about the firm’s capabilities; this is the matching 
theory of learning. The third approach concentrates on how a firm observes what other firms do and draws 
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inferences about what may be useful to emulate; this is the social learning theory. The mode of learning and 
the combination of sources from which information is drawn are likely to depend on the object of learning; 
the process of learning about production technologies possibly differs from the process of learning about 
organizational technologies. Since our concern in this paper is with human resource systems, we develop the 
three approaches with reference to learning about them.  
We classify human resource systems relative to the allocation of decision-making and of financial 
returns as the central elements of organizational structure (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1990) and distinguish 
among four systems on the basis of their reliance on employee involvement in decision-making through 
teamwork and similar mechanisms, and reliance on group or firm-level incentives such as group bonus, 
profit sharing, and employee stock ownership. The four systems are the traditional system, which entails 
centralized decision-making and fixed pay; the decision-making system, which implements decentralization 
of decision-making via employee involvement but is associated with fixed pay; the financial incentives 
system, which relies on group and firm-level financial incentives but not employee involvement in decision-
making; and the high-performance system, which combines the decision-making and financial incentives 
systems. This classification is summarized in Figure 2. Moving away from the traditional system entails a 
move to a more complex human resource operation. 
The early 1980s saw the introduction of new systems of work organization. In a majority of firms, 
the long-standing human resource system that prevailed in the United States at the time was the traditional 
system. Under the traditional system, employees have little control over how their work is done, work 
according to rules and procedures established by superiors, operate under close supervision, and are 
compensated through fixed wages that change over time primarily as a function of an employee’s tenure. 
Since the early 1980s, novel ways of motivating, compensating, and coordinating employees have been 
introduced. These include greater reliance on employees to make decisions, and making part of employees’ 
compensation dependent on group or firm results. Involving employees in decision-making and in financial 
returns requires changes in training and other practices; this ensemble of human resource practices came to 
be known as the high-performance system. Some firms adopted only halfway measures, introducing 
employee involvement in decision-making but no incentives, or implementing financial incentives but no 
involvement in decision-making.5
 The four systems can be differentiated along three principal dimensions: the organizational 
capabilities necessary for effective operation of a system, the costs of operating a system, and the benefits 
that stem from the operation of a system. Organizational capabilities, a concept emphasized by Chandler 
(1992), concerns a complex set of skills, know-how, and traditions that reside in many parts of an 
organization, in both management and workers, but cannot be observed directly. Organizational capabilities 
reflect the ability of managers to select the appropriate mechanisms for allocation of decision-making, the 
                                                 
5 See Appelbaum and Batt (1994) and Cappelli et al. (1997) for historical accounts of the evolution of human resource systems. 
 7
appropriate incentives to induce employees and managers to act in the organization’s interests and to put in 
place supporting practices such as training. An important element of organizational capabilities is the 
development and maintenance of organizational culture that promotes a sense of duty and dedication that 
mutes the effects of self-interest and ameliorates free ridership in ways that cannot be accomplished with 
incentives alone (Kreps, 1990, Kandel and Lazear, 1993, Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995). Organizational 
capabilities reside in managers and workers and their training or replacement may enhance organizational 
capabilities, but the fact that hiring is commonly done by existing staff various forces of inertia prevents 
significant transformation of a firm’s capabilities. It is therefore meaningful to think of firms as having, in 
the short run, a nearly fixed level of organizational capabilities.6
In our framework, the costs required to operate effectively a particular human resources system are 
fixed and independent of organizational capabilities. The high-performance system is the most costly 
because it requires investment in training to enable employees to make sound decisions, and requires 
financial commitments to provide effective incentives. The decision-making and financial incentives 
systems each entails lower costs than the high-performance system; it is impossible to rank these systems 
without specific operational and contextual details. The lowest-cost system is the traditional system.7 The 
magnitude of the benefits a firm can reap increases with organizational capabilities. Poor management can 
make a mess of a human resources system; for example, poorly-organized teams and expensive incentives 
that do not address appropriately free ridership can cause severe performance problems, and the more 
complex the system the more severe are the problems that poor management can cause. In contrast, a firm 
possessing superior organizational capabilities can take advantage of the potential of the high-performance 
system and can generate a higher level of performance than it could from employing any other system. Thus 
a high-capability firm performs best with the high-performance system, whereas a firm with low 
organizational capabilities performs best when it employs the traditional system. The intermediate systems 
yield greater benefits when supported by appropriate organizational capabilities, which rank in between the 
levels required by the traditional and high-performance systems. However, a decision-making system 
cannot operate effectively without the complement of financial incentives, that is, without being 
transformed into a high-performance system. The reason for that is that self-interested employees and 
management will use their decision-making power to pursue activities that benefit them rather than the 
organization. Similarly, a financial system may provide appropriate incentives but in the absence of 
decentralization of decision-making and delegation to employees, they cannot act on their incentives, which 
are therefore wasted. Thus, only the high-performance system can take advantage of the complementarity 
between financial incentives and decision-making delegation; an intermediate system will therefore perform 
worse than a high-performance system and possibly worse even than the traditional system (Ben-Ner and 
                                                 
6 The near-constancy of rankings of academic departments bears witness to this idea.  
7 See Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) for a detailed discussion of the costs of operating different human resource systems. Note that these costs are on-
going costs the firm pays for maintaining the system. We assume they are system-specific and time invariant. 
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Jones, 1995, Levine and Tyson, 1990). The question is therefore why would a firm adopt an intermediate 
system at all? The answer is probably that some firms cannot make the leap from the traditional to the high-
performance system and move temporarily to an intermediate system. This is compatible with the two-stage 
transitions observed in Table 1.8
The foregoing argument emphasizes the contingency or match between capabilities and system,9 
and it can be formalized as follows. Define firm j’s productivity under system s at time t as 10
 
     yjts = bs xjt – cs + ujt,              (1) 
 
where xjt is firm j’s capabilities at time t, cs and bs are the costs and benefits of system s, respectively, and ujt 
is a random productivity shock. For simplicity of exposition, assume that there are only two systems, H for 
high-performance and T for traditional.11 The costs of implementing and operating the system that requires 
greater organizational capabilities, which we will term the more complex system, are larger than those 
associated with the traditional system:  cH > cT. We further assume that the benefits from system H exceed 
those of system T, bH > bT  for all levels of organizational capabilities. 
Figure 3 depicts productivity under systems H and T as a function of firm capabilities, assuming 
that managers know precisely their firms’ capabilities as well as the costs and benefits of each system. 
Define x* = (cH – cT)/(bH – bT)  as the level of capabilities that corresponds to equal productivity in both 
systems. Firms with capabilities xjt < x* (xjt >= x*) have a comparative advantage in operating the traditional 
system, whereas firms with capabilities xjt >= x* are more productive operating the high-performance 
system.  
A firm’s human resources system is adjusted over time as a result of learning by decision-makers. 
The three theories of learning differ with respect to the nature of the information that is learned and how it is 
learned. In learning-by-doing, firms learn how to do things better, that is, they improve their capabilities, xjt. 
In matching theory, improved information about the firm’s own capabilities leads to learning about the 
                                                 
8 Gant, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2002) show that the process of transition from the traditional to the high-performance system entails not just the 
formal addition of incentives and the shifting of decision-making responsibilities to line employees, but also a complicated restructuring of a myriad 
of relationships among employees. 
9 Many researchers argue that the high-performance system generates better performance than other systems (e.g., Kochan and Osterman, 1994, 
MacDuffie 1995), but some authors claim that superior performance is contingent on organizational capabilities (Baron and Kreps, 1999).  
10 A similar productivity framework that integrates matching and learning has been used by Gibbons and Waldman (1999). In these authors’ 
framework, learning about workers’ ability affects the dynamics of switching to a higher or lower job level. An important assumption in their 
framework is that higher job levels are more sensitive to worker ability than lower job levels. In the present paper, we assume similarly that systems 
are rank-ordered by complexity level, and we assume that more complex systems bring greater benefits for higher-capability firms. The ordering of 
systems by complexity follows naturally from the definition of the traditional and high-performance systems. Although a ranking of the financial 
incentives and the decision-making systems is not obvious, both systems can be viewed as intermediary systems with complexity level in between 
the traditional and high-performance system. Although a distinction between the two systems would be necessary for generality of the analysis, the 
transition table (Table 1) shows that there are very few switches between the two systems.     
11 We conduct the discussion in this subsection in terms of these two systems only. The two intermediate systems, the decision-making system D 
and the financial incentives system F, are more complex than T but simpler than H. It is not possible, and it turns out that it is not necessary, to rank 
the two systems relative to each other because the limited number of observations forces us to treat the two systems in most analyses as the same. 
The analytical framework developed in this section can be readily extended to incorporate a third, intermediate system, and we do so in the 
estimation section. 
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match. In social learning theory, information about systems’ costs and benefits is obtained from observing 
other firms operating these systems. We develop further these three theories and use them to understand 
how firms decide to keep or change systems.  
 
a) Learning-by-doing 
The economic literature on organizational learning can be traced to Arrow’s (1962) contribution, 
which focused on the role of experience on organizational productivity; subsequent investigations examined 
the process of introduction, implementation, and assimilation of new production technologies. A key 
argument of this literature is that the mastery of a new technique by an organization requires adjustments 
and learning by many individuals who participate in production. This process takes time, and the initial 
productivity of a new technology will be only a fraction of its full potential. The theory predicts, and 
empirical findings generally support, the existence of a learning curve that implies that the productivity of a 
new technology rises over a few years, then levels off (Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995, 1996, Cabral and 
Leiblein, 2001).  
The learning-by-doing theory focuses on how experience enhances organizational capabilities. Let 
us assume that xjt = γj*t, that is, capabilities are a function of experience t and a firm-specific capabilities 
parameter γj. This formulation allows for heterogeneity in the rate at which capabilities grow and for the 
possibility that higher-γj firms (those with greater baseline capabilities) learn faster than others. Learning 
from experience may improve an organization’s ability to exploit more productively its current human 
resources system. At the same time, experience may also improve a firm’s ability to operate any human 
resources system by generating knowledge that is transferable across systems. If organizational capabilities 
accumulate like human capital, then the longer a firm has experience with a relatively simple system, the 
better it will be able to take advantage of the greater productivity of a more complex system; therefore, as 
capabilities xjt grow over time, at some point they reach the threshold level x* for switching to the high-
performance system H. Learning-by-doing therefore predicts that the length of experience with a particular 
system increases the likelihood of switching to a more complex system.12
Learning-by-doing also has implications for the dynamics of firm performance. In a “pure” 
learning-by-doing framework without firm heterogeneity, the typical learning curve predicts that after an 
initial period of adjustment to the new system, productivity will increase with experience (capabilities) but 
at a decreasing rate (Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995). The introduction of firm heterogeneity implies that firms 
with different capabilities accumulate experience at different rates, leading to different learning curves. The 
difference in the productivity profiles of firms with the traditional and high-performance systems as a 
function of experience with each system is illustrated in Figure 4. For simplicity, we assume that there are 
                                                 
12 This prediction depends on the extent to which the capabilities accumulated under one system are transferable to a more complex system. If there 
is no transferability at all, the length of experience should not affect the switching likelihood.  
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two types, low and high capability, γL and γH  such that γL < γH , and following the optimal matching rule 
illustrated in Figure 3,  γL (γH) firms are better matched with the traditional (high-performance) system. 
Therefore, in the presence of firm heterogeneity, an additional prediction of learning-by-doing is that the 
productivity profile of firms matched with the high-performance system should be above the profile of firms 
matched with the traditional system.  
 
b) Learning about the match  
We assume now that management does not observe perfectly the firm’s organizational capabilities 
γj, but it does know the costs and benefits associated with each system. How do managers learn about their 
firms’ capability to operate different human resource systems? The Bayesian learning literature, initiated by 
Jovanovic (1982), developed the idea that managers have some prior beliefs about their firms’ 
organizational capabilities and update these beliefs using various signals they receive over time. The signal 
about capabilities is derived from equation (1): Zjt = γj*t + ujt = (yjts + cs)/bs, where ujt reflects productivity 
shocks. In this formulation, the signal, and therefore learning about γj, is independent of the firm’s current 
system and is therefore extracted from the observation of the firm’s productivity; with time-dependent 
productivity shocks, learning occurs gradually.13   
Managers thus update their beliefs every period on the basis of the history of signals they extract 
from observing previous period productivity, Z0, . . . , Zm, where m stands for the age of the firm.14 The level 
of expected organizational capabilities therefore evolves over time as the beliefs change with changes in 
realized productivity. If the perceived capabilities exceed the threshold, management will decide to switch 
to a more complex system; otherwise it will stay with the current one. Higher realized productivity in one 
period resulting from a positive productivity shock ujt signals to management that the firm may be of the 
high-capability type. It follows that the change in expected capabilities between t and t + 1 is an increasing 
function of previous-period changes in productivity. The decision to switch to system H at time t will follow 
the realization of positive changes in productivity between t − 2 and t − 1, if the productivity increases are 
large enough to bring expected capabilities above the threshold for switching systems. The likelihood of 
switching to the more complex system is therefore positively associated with previous-period changes in 
productivity.15
In summary, the Bayesian learning framework suggests that the decision to move to a more 
complex human resources system should be positively influenced by past performance; more precisely, a 
recent change in performance supplies a signal that conveys new information about firm organizational 
capabilities. In assessing its capacity to embrace organizational innovations, management is likely not to 
                                                 
13 The Bayesian learning framework described here is an application of the framework defined in Gibbons and Waldman (1999). 
14  Defining p= P(γ = γH  / Zjt-m, … Zjt-1), the Bayes rule for updating beliefs is given by  
P(γ = γH  / Zjt-m, … Zjt-1 , Zjt) = [p*g(Zjt - γH*t)]/[ p*g(Zjt - γH*t) + (1-p) *g(Zjt - γH*t)], where g is the density of ujt. 
15 See the Appendix in Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a proof of this assertion.   
 11
rely on the firm’s distant history of performance, but to seek new information in the form of changes in 
performance. Improvement in performance signals high organizational capabilities and therefore the 
suggestion to adopt a more costly but also more productive human resources system, whereas unchanged or 
declining performance indicates low capability and a suggestion to stay with the current system or possibly 
switch to a less complex system than the current one.  
 
c) Social learning  
Firms adjust their organizational structure not only by looking inward at their own experiences, but 
also by observing other firms’ actions, as well as learning from consultants, colleagues in professional 
organizations, and academics. Just as individuals learn intentionally from other individuals (Merlo and 
Schotter, 2003), managers too may observe the behavior of other firms to learn effective ways of organizing 
their firms’ human resources. Managers may also follow other firms’ ways to gain legitimacy with 
employees, customers, suppliers, and others on whom they depend (Hannan and Freeman, 1978). Not all 
emulation is beneficial: managers may follow others in “herd behavior” fashion at the expense of more 
relevant signals, which is likely to result in inferior performance (Banerjee, 1992). Learning from the 
experience of others may complement or even substitute for learning from one’s own experience. 
If from their own experience managers learn how to do things better, or figure out their own 
capabilities, what may they learn from others’ experiences? Other firms’ experiences may supply 
information or signals about the costs and benefits of systems with which managers do not have direct 
experience. In particular, managers of firms with system T do not know precisely the costs and benefits of 
system H, and therefore do not know the minimum or threshold level of organizational capabilities x* that a 
firm must possess in order to switch successfully to system H. Consider a manager in a firm with system T 
with prior beliefs about x* represented by the distribution g(x*). The manager in firm j observes a signal sj = 
x* + εj, where εj is N(0, σ2ε), and decides to switch to H if the firm’s known organizational capabilities xj 
exceed the signaled threshold capabilities, i.e., xj > sj ≡ x* + εj. In a typical environment, the manager 
observes no more than the actual choices of other firms and needs to make sense of that information. The 
decisions of other firms (which have made their system selection decisions in the past) depend on their own 
capabilities as well as on their own beliefs about x*. The manager reasons that all else equal, firms are more 
likely to adopt H if they receive a signal telling them that x* is low because their capabilities are more likely 
to exceed a lower x* than a higher one. Hence, the larger the number of adopters of H, the more likely that 
many firms received information that x* is low. The manager incorporates this information into his or her 
own beliefs and revises downward the expectation of x*.16  
                                                 
16 Assume that in the previous period, there were N firms with system T that had to decide (irreversibly) whether to adopt H, based on no 
information other than their own signals. Each firm switches if and only if xj > sj ≡ x* + εj. In the current period, from the point of view of the 
manager who seeks to make a decision whether to switch, the xjs and εjs of the N firms are unobservable, and only the number of firms that chose to 
adopt the H system is known. The manager uses this information to make inferences about x*. Let k be the number of firms observed to have 
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Managers can reduce the noise in the signals they observe by seeking information in addition to the 
proportion of firms using different systems. The information that managers seek and the value of what they 
learn from others may be correlated with their abilities: better managers are likely to more carefully seek out 
information relevant to their decisions. Managers will seek information not only regarding the distribution 
of systems but also about the performance of firms with different systems, with the obvious prediction that 
better-performing systems in a particular industry will be more likely to be adopted. Large firms enjoy 
economies of scale in taking on this sort of learning. Firms located near other firms are better placed for 
networking with colleagues and others who possess useful knowledge than are isolated firms (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993, Beaudry and Breschi, 2003, Erickson and Jacoby, 2003). Firms located 
in or near large metropolitan areas usually have these advantages, as well as relatively easy access to 
sources of information about human resource systems—conferences, professional enhancement courses, 
consultants, academics, and higher-quality managers and employees—compared to firms located farther 
away (Audretsch and Lehman, 2005).17  
In summary, the networking element of social learning suggests that learning is enhanced by 
geographic concentration of firms and proximity to centers of knowledge, particularly when many firms are 
in the same industry. The imitation aspect of social learning suggests that the larger the number of firms in 
an industry and geographic area that practice a particular system, the more likely that any individual firm 
will be exposed to information about that system and therefore adopt it; if managers can obtain information 
about the performance of firms with different systems, they will likely adopt the system that performs best 
in their industry. Overall, we expect that the quality and quantity of information firms obtain from observing 
others operating the more complex system will increase the likelihood of switching to that system.  
 
d) Speed of learning 
The speed with which a firm learns depends on how much decision-makers need to learn relative to 
their current knowledge, how fast they can learn, and how fast individual learning can be transformed into 
collective learning and action. Generally, these depend on the skills and knowledge of the individual 
decision-makers that populate them, the availability of resources they can use to aid learning, and how the 
organizational structure maps individual views into collective decisions.  
The assumption that firms differ in their rate of growth of organizational capabilities (xjt = γj*t) 
generates the prediction that firms with greater baseline capabilities will adopt more complex systems 
                                                                                                                                                                
adopted H. Then the expected value of x* is a decreasing function of k. From the point of view of the manager, the probability that any one of the N 
firms adopts the more complex system H is given by PI(x*) ≡ P(xj - εj > x*). Given x* and N, the probability that exactly k out of N firms would 
choose system H is P(k |x*), which follows a binomial distribution (P(k |x*) = b(k |PI(x*), N)). The manager makes inferences about x* from k by 
applying Bayes’ rule: P(x*|k) = P(k|x*) PI(x*)/P(k)  = b(k |PI(x*), N). g(x*) /[ ∫ b(k/ PI(x*), N). g(x*) dx*]. Consider two different realizations of k, 
k0 and k1, where k0 < k1. The distribution P(x*|k0) first-order stochastically dominates P(x*|k1). The observation of a high realization of k causes the 
observing firm to update its beliefs about x* by assigning more weight to the possibility that x* is low and less weight to the possibility that x* is 
high. The result is that E(x*|k) = ∫ p(x*|k) x* dx* decreases in k. See Chamley and Gale (1994) for a more general framework. 
17 The location of firms in metropolitan areas is motivated in part by the desire to have access to knowledge and skilled employees (Glaeser and 
Maré, 2001). 
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faster. ‘Baseline capabilities’ is a concept that can be rarely observed and measured directly; however, it is 
often asserted that organizational capabilities are positively associated with firm size, location in a 
metropolitan area, and wages.18  
Bureaucratic structures impede the transmission of knowledge through an organization and 
therefore organizational learning. Larger organizations are often more bureaucratic than smaller ones, but 
they also have access to more skilled employees and enjoy economies of scale in many areas, including the 
acquisition of information and learning.19 Organizations located in large metropolitan areas have access to 
pools of skilled labor that are not available in other areas. They also have access to face-to-face networking 
opportunities. These factors contribute to faster learning. Because larger firms and firms in metropolitan 
areas are also high-wage firms, we expect that higher-wage firms will adopt new systems more rapidly 
(Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987). 
Organizational resistance may slow system change. Employees and managers may oppose change 
for material and psychological reasons. Moving away from a system of fixed wages (the traditional system 
or decision-making system) to one in which some compensation is at risk (the financial incentives system 
and the high-performance system) and from well-defined lines of responsibility (traditional system or 
financial incentives system) to greater employee involvement (decision-making and high-performance 
systems) represents threats to many employees and managers who are likely to oppose it. Hence, the longer 
an organization spends with a system, the greater the likelihood of resistance to change to another system. 
This factor operates in the same direction as learning-by-doing, adding to the negative effect of experience 
on changing to a more complex system. Firm age, which is correlated with experience, is similarly a 
deterrent on the speed of adoption. Older organizations have more long-established practices with employee 
interests tied to preserving them, so they are more likely to have internal obstacles to making changes 
associated with learning, and more obstacles to learning that may call for undesirable changes.  
 
e) Summary of hypotheses 
 The discussion in this section focused on two systems, the traditional and the high-performance 
systems, the latter more complex than the former. We now summarize the discussion in the form of 
hypotheses and extend it to the four systems introduced earlier. As noted previously, the decision-making 
and financial systems are more complex than the traditional system but less so than the high-performance 
one, but we cannot rank them. We will treat the two intermediate systems as equally complex, and extend 
the predictions derived for the two systems to include the third intermediate possibility.  
 
                                                 
18 It is well-known that larger firms pay higher wages and employ more skilled workers than smaller firms (Brown and Medoff, 1980, Troske, 
1999). Florida (1995) argues that metropolitan areas attract more skilled workers; this relates to Glaeser and Maré’s (2001) argument about reasons 
for the location of firms. 
19 For example, many large organizations belong to professional organizations that are constituted primarily in order to exchange ideas and 
knowledge, have the ability to purchase the expertise of experts, and so on—things that small organizations cannot afford. 
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H1: Learning from experience by doing 
The probability of switching to a more complex system increases with experience (H1a). Firm 
productivity increases with experience with a given system, but the rate of increase decreases over time 
(H1b). In the presence of firm heterogeneity and matching, the productivity profile of firms matched 
with the high-performance system should be above the productivity profile of firms matched with the 
less complex system (H1c). 
 
H2: Learning about the match between a firm’s abilities and its human resource system  
The likelihood of switching to a more complex system increases with improvements in performance 
(H2). 
 
H3: Social learning by observation 
The likelihood of switching to a more complex system decreases with the degree of a firm’s isolation 
from other firms (H3a) and increases with the proximity to a metropolitan center (H3b). The likelihood 
that a firm will switch to a particular system increases with the proportion of firms practicing that 
system (H3c) and with the average performance of similar firms that are already practicing that system 
(H3d).  
 
H4: Speed of learning 
The speed of adjustment to a more complex system increases with firm size (H4a), with firm average 
real wages (H4b), and with firm proximity to metropolitan centers (H4c) and decreases with firm age 
(H4d). 
 
A firm may not know its own organizational capabilities and the costs and benefits of alternative 
human resource systems, and at the same time it may learn by doing from its own experience. Hence, the 
different approaches to learning do not necessarily compete with each other, but may be used in tandem or 
seriatim by a particular firm. The hypothesis testing in the next section allows explicitly for this possibility. 
The conceptual framework we use has the advantage of combining different learning sources into a 
single productivity equation to derive predictions about learning outcomes in terms of human resource 
system and productivity changes. This perspective however does not address directly the role of 
complementary factors which also affect productivity and workplace organization changes, including 
computerization, production technology and business strategy (Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2005). In fact, 
our matching framework implicitly assumes that organizational capabilities γj is positively correlated with 
decisions of computerization and customized production (or that the benefits of the combination of 
computerization, customized production and high-performance system are greater for higher-capability 
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firms); although we focus on how learning about γj affects firms’ decisions related to workplace 
organization, learning about γj is also likely to affect the decision to complement the change in workplace 
organization with computerization and customized production strategies.20
III. Data and Variables 
 
a) The dataset 
Our main analysis focuses on 110 publicly-traded firms for which we assembled a longitudinal dataset. 
We obtained data on human resource practices, unionization status, geographic location, and other firm 
characteristics from the Minnesota Human Resources Management Practices Survey. Wage and 
employment data come from the Minnesota Department of Economic Security’s unemployment insurance 
(UI) files, and financial data from Standard and Poor’s Compustat. This section describes briefly the survey 
and the key variables.  
The survey was administered in 1994 to all publicly-traded firms with at least 20 employees that were 
headquartered and operated in the state of Minnesota. The survey was conducted by mail, with a phone 
survey administered to the firms that did not respond. The overall response rate was 61% (177 firms), a rate 
that exceeds that of most similar surveys. The sample period was determined primarily by the availability of 
wage and employment data from 1980 on. The panel dataset spans the period 1980–1994 and consists of 
time-variant and a few time-invariant variables. The final sample consists of up to 110 firms for which the 
key financial variables were available from Compustat as well as information on firm size and industry. 21  
The variables used in the analysis are summarized in Appendix Table A1. In addition to the data for the 
publicly-traded firms, we have longitudinal data – but no financial information – for 690 privately-held 
firms; the data for these firms come from the same sources as for the publicly-traded firms. For coherence 
and completeness of analysis, we focus our attention on the sample of publicly-traded firms for which we 
have information on performance outcome, but for comparison purposes we present results for the full 
sample of firms in Appendix Table 2. The sample is unbalanced in that not all firms are observed over the 
same period; for the sample of publicly-traded firms, the number of firms at the start of the sample period 
was 39, and by the year of the survey (1994), the number was 110. Overall, the average number of years a 
firm is in the sample is 7.8 years.  
                                                 
20 Validating empirically this claim requires longitudinal information on computerization, production technologies and business strategy decisions in 
addition to the firm’s choice of human resource system. Unfortunately we do not have this information in our dataset.  On the other hand, the survey 
provides information on the task environment within firms for the core employees for the survey year of 1994 and in particular, the level of 
complexity of the tasks performed. We do find a strong significant positive effect of task complexity on the likelihood of choosing a more complex 
system after running either a multinomial logit for the likelihood of choosing the traditional, intermediate or high-performance systems or an 
ordered logit (controlling for firm characteristics such as industry, unionization and firm size). This is consistent with the idea of a positive 
correlation between technology and workplace organization. 
21 Because the analysis hereafter requires the use of lags in performance changes, the final sample contains 110 firms with at least 2 years of data on 
all the variables and the sample period reduces to 13 years, from 1982-1994. 
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 Responding firms provided detailed current information about various human resource practices and 
other facets of their internal organization, including the year the practices were introduced or 
discontinued.22 We constructed the dummy variables that represent the four human resource systems, the 
key dependent variables in this paper, as follows. The variable that represents the system that entails 
employee involvement in decision-making (D) is coded 1 in year t if the firm had at least one of the 
following employee involvement programs in that year: quality of working life teams, quality circles, 
autonomous work teams, joint labor-management teams, or employee representatives on the board of 
directors. The variable that represents the financial incentives system (F) is coded 1 if the firm had at least 
one of the following: an employee stock ownership or purchase plan, a current or deferred profit-sharing 
plan, a gain-sharing plan, or a group bonus plan. The high-performance system (H) was coded 1 if the firm 
had both F=1 and D=1, whereas the traditional system (T) was coded 1 if the firm had both F=0 and D=0.  
In terms of system changes, 72.7% of firms (80 out of 110 firms) experience at least one system switch. 
Table 1 provides the number of potential and actual transitions across systems (where the unit of 
observation is firm-year). As noted in the Introduction, about 90% of the potential transitions entailed a 
decision to stay with the current system. Most of the actual transitions represent switching from the 
traditional system to the financial incentives, decision-making, and high-performance systems, followed by 
switches from the financial incentives system to the high-performance system. The high-performance 
system is the most stable one, with only five moves out of it, none of which are to the traditional system. 
 
b) Variables 
Multiple variables were used to characterize the different learning mechanism. For learning-by-doing, 
we use information on the number of years of experience with a system (including experience prior to 
1980, as this variable does not require wage or employment information). The system with which firms 
have most experience is, of course, the traditional system. The high-performance system, being the most 
recent, has been in use for only 1.52 years on average. For matching, we use the lagged difference in 
relative returns on investment (ROI). To compute the relative returns, average returns on investment in the 
firm’s industry were subtracted from the firm’s own returns on investment. Industry categories are broadly 
defined as services, trade, and manufacturing.  
For social learning, we characterize variables associated with geographic concentration using 
information on the firm’s total distance to other firms as a measure of the firm’s isolation and its 
                                                 
22 The survey is available at http://webpages.csom.umn.edu/hrir/abenner/web/papers/work-surv/work-surv-01.pdf. Respondents were typically the 
highest human resources executive in the firm; in smaller firms the respondent was frequently the top executive in the firm. We debriefed several 
respondents about how they obtained retrospective information about dates of introduction and discontinuation of practices; we were told that it 
came mostly from company records or their or their colleagues’ recollections.  
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networking opportunities.23 To capture opportunities for learning from other sources as well as for 
networking, we use a firm’s distance to downtown Minneapolis. We chose downtown Minneapolis because 
several important institutions that provide opportunities for networking or transfer of knowledge are located 
there.24 The distance measures were computed based on information on a firm’s postal zip code, using the 
software package Zip Code Distance Wizard.25 We characterize information about other firms’ systems by 
computing the distribution of systems in the firm’s own industry as well as the average performance of 
firms in the firm’s own industry under each system. Because firms may use information about other firms 
more similar to them in other aspects in addition to industry, these two measures were also computed using 
system and performance information for firms with similar size, age, and similarly located within 10 miles 
of Minneapolis.26
In addition to the previous variables, we use firm size, the firm’s industry (manufacturing, trade, or 
services) and whether the firm’s workforce is unionized as control variables. We also use information about 
the firm’s average real wages to control for firm heterogeneity. Due to a potential endogeneity problem, we 
use information about the firm’s average real wages only in the year the firm entered the sample. Sample 
statistics for these variables are presented in Appendix Table 1 (for time-variant variables, the means are 
calculated over time). 
In the analysis of the speed of learning, we concentrate on the effects of firm age and size, the 
distance measures discussed previously, and average real wage when a firm entered the sample, as well as a 
firm’s industry and unionization status.  
   
IV. Empirical Strategy 
 
Learning is not observable; we can only identify the consequences of learning, which in the present 
analysis correspond to the presence or absence of system change at a given point in time as well as to 
improvement in performance. Our estimation strategy regarding system change is based on a latent variable 
framework in which the latent variable represents the year-to-year net benefits of system adjustments. We 
make inferences about the net benefits associated with a system change from the observation of a firm’s 
decision whether to change its system in a given year. Learning is captured empirically through variables 
that reflect the extent of a firm’s knowledge of the current and other available systems as well as of its own 
capabilities to operate the systems. In the learning-by-doing framework, learning about the system’s 
                                                 
23 The total distance from other firms reflects only firms in our dataset. This may not be fully representative of the actual distribution of firms across 
the state and therefore of the true networking opportunities each firm faces. The variable indicating total distance from other firms is therefore likely 
to be a biased measure of the extent of firms’ isolation. 
24 For example, the University of Minnesota’s Technology Transfer Office and School of Management are within a mile of the center point, as is the 
meeting place of the human resource executives’ organization mentioned in footnote 3. We experimented with broadening the center point, but the 
results are essentially unchanged. 
25 The software is sold by Atlantic Coast PLC, located in Devon, England. 
26 We used three categories for firm size (less than 99 employees, 100–499 employees, and 500 or more employees) and four categories for firm age 
(less than 4 years, 5–10 years, 11–20 years, and above 20 years). 
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specificities is reflected in a firm’s accumulated capabilities to run its current system; these capabilities are 
assumed to be perfectly observed. The matching and social learning frameworks introduce imperfect 
information, and learning consists of firms’ usage of signals to make inferences about imperfectly 
observable variables, their own organizational capabilities, and the systems’ costs and benefits. In addition, 
we estimate productivity profiles as a function of system experience to test for the existence of a learning 
curve. 
To assess empirically the importance of the three learning mechanisms for a firm’s decision to 
adjust its system of human resources and the speed of adjustment, we employ estimation strategies based on 
logit and multinomial estimations, and conduct hazard estimations of the likelihood of system adjustment. 
Our objective is to test for the presence of significant learning effects on system adjustments (following the 
hypotheses summarized at the end of section II) against the null of no significant learning effects for each of 
the learning variables we have identified. For matching and social learning, the insignificance of variables 
that stand for the various signals (change in performance, distance to other firms, etc.) would imply no 
learning associated with these particular variables. However, in the context of learning-by-doing, successful 
learning may lead managers to the conclusion that a system adjustment should not occur, just as would 
absence of learning. Our empirical question is therefore not about whether firms learn, but rather to assess 
what firms learn when making decisions to change systems. The finding of significant learning effects on 
firms’ adjustments decisions provides evidence against effects associated with random occurrences and 
luck.  
We interpret the significance of the variables described above as evidence of learning effects on the 
likelihood of switching systems but alternative explanations that do not necessarily involve learning  may 
be proposed. For example, experience with a system may proxy for other factors we cannot measure with 
our data like timing issues related to the implementation of computerization or a change in business 
strategy which are complementary to the adoption of a more complex human resources system. Whereas 
we assume that a positive change in performance reflects greater (unmeasured) firm capabilities, this may 
also reflect greater availability of resources that permit implementation of more complex systems. We 
assume that access to knowledge through proximity to a city positively influences the switch to a more 
complex system, but it is possible that more innovative firms locate near cities (so that geographic location 
is not exogenous as we assume) and innovative firms are also more likely to adopt more complex human 
resource systems. These explanations notwithstanding, our results provide evidence of the informational 
role of the included variables, which we interpret as proxies for learning.  
The three approaches to learning describe learning mechanisms that many firms are likely to use 
concurrently. An estimation framework of a firm’s decision to adjust or keep a system that combines or 
nests the three mechanisms may be written as follows: 
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P(St/S’t-1) = F1(expts) + F2(Δyjt-1)  + F3(INothers at t-1, IPothers at t-1, log(1+ Distcity)) + εt ,         (2) 
 
where St is the new system and S’t-1 is the previous system, F1 is the learning-by-doing effect described by a 
function of experience with a given system at time t, F2 is the matching effect, a function of previous 
changes in firm performance, and F3 is the social learning function based on previous-period information 
about the distribution of firms and their average performance by system (INothers and IPothers),27 the sum of the 
distance of the firm to Minneapolis28, and  εt is a random noise. 
We implemented this general framework in two ways, balancing generality with data restrictions. 
We first estimated the likelihood of a change to a more complex human resources system (from T to F, D, 
or H, or from F and D to H) versus the alternative of no change in system or change to a less complex 
system, against the variables listed in equation (2).29 In this logit estimation, the probabilities of adjusting 
systems are independent of a firm’s current system. 
Next we further investigate the different learning effects by estimating separate conditional 
probability frameworks by the type of a firm’s current system.30 We perform multinomial estimations of 
the likelihood of switching out of the traditional system either into the decision-making or financial 
incentives system, and logit estimations for the likelihood of switching out of the decision-making or 
financial incentive systems into the high-performance system.31  
In addition, we investigate the speed of learning by estimating a hazard model of factors that may 
affect the timing of adoption of a more complex system; we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model and 
parametric hazard models based on the exponential and Weibull distributions.  
Finally, for evidence of a learning curve implied by learning-by-doing, we estimate and test for the 
concavity of productivity profiles as a function of experience with a given system; we regress firm 
performance as measured by the firm’s returns on investment (ROI) on a quadratic function of system 
experience, controlling for industry, union, and firm size.32 Moreover, the presence of firm heterogeneity 
and matching effects on the learning curve can be emphasized indirectly by comparing differences in the 
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, where N is the number of firms at t-1, y is firm productivity, j indexes the industry, and s 
indexes the human resources system of firms in industry j at t-1. 
28 We also used Distothers, the sum of the distances of the firm to other firms as well as DistSysH, the sum of the distances of the firm to other firms with 
the high-performance system. 
29 As Table 1 indicates, very few changes are made to a lower-complexity system, so these cannot be evaluated separately. 
30 Learning effects may depend on a firm’s current system, and the learning mechanism on which a firm relies more may also be a function of its 
current system. For example, firms with the traditional system may learn more from their own experience than firms that have already adopted a 
somewhat complex system like the financial incentive or decision-making systems, and learning about a firm’s own capabilities may be more 
important for the decision to switch out of the traditional system than learning about costs and benefits of a system by observing other firms’ 
information.  
31 A multinomial estimation is not possible in this case because of the small number of transitions out of systems D or F down to system T. 
32 The quadratic function seems to be a natural choice for estimating productivity profiles but may also be too restrictive. To add more flexibility, 
we also performed the estimations adding a cubic term to the specification.  
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profiles of firm performance across systems.33 To take into account the compositional bias in the estimation 
of the yearly performance profile for a given system caused by the presence of firms joining in or switching 
out of that system at any point in time, we perform the estimations only on the sample of firms that did not 
experience a change in system over the 13-year sample period, for which we assume that matching may 
have occurred in the past. We also include observations post-change for firms that indicate a change in 
system in a given year during the sample period. The significance of the quadratic term provides evidence in 
favor of the concavity of the learning curve, and significant differences in the slopes of the profiles across 
systems would indicate the importance of matching effects.  
 
V. Results 
 
The presentation of the results follows the order suggested by the empirical strategy. The logit 
analysis is reported in Table 2. The results of the separate probability estimations by type of system for 
each learning mechanism are given in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The results from the hazard analysis are in Table 
6. The results of the performance regressions are presented in Table 7 and illustrated in Figure 5. Appendix 
A provides a discussion of the sample size differences associated with the use of different dependent 
variables in different analyses. 
 
a) Learning-by-Doing, Matching, and Social Learning  
Column (1) of Table 2 focuses on learning-by-doing, column (2) on matching, and columns (3)–(6) 
summarize the social learning results. The last two columns present the results when the three learning 
mechanisms are estimated jointly with different social learning measures. The results in column (1) show 
that the marginal effect of experience with a given system is to reduce the likelihood of switching to a more 
complex system with a negative estimated slope and positive quadratic term. The effect is significant for 
the financial incentives system. The effect for the decision-making system is similar but more imprecisely 
estimated and the effect for the traditional system is weaker. The U-shape pattern implies that experience 
with a given system starts to have a positive effect on the likelihood of switching after a few years. In 
particular, one can compute that it takes 12 years of accumulated experience for experience with the 
traditional system to increase the likelihood of switching to a more complex system, while it takes only 5.9 
years for experience with the financial incentives system and three years for experience with the decision-
making system to increase the probability of a system switch. It therefore takes a while for a firm to 
accumulate expertise that enables it to operate a more complex system. The time required to develop such 
                                                 
33 To emphasize the combined effects of learning-by-doing and matching, productivity profiles could be estimated based on equation (1). The 
presence of endogeneity in the choice of workplace system and in the decision to switch system (due to learning) implies the use of nonlinear 
instrumental variable estimation in the same spirit as Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2005) and Lluis (2005). However the small size of our 
sample limits our ability to use such a procedure.  
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expertise depends on a firm’s current system: it takes longer to be ready to switch out of the traditional 
system than from the decision-making or financial incentives systems. In terms of our initial hypotheses, 
these results imply that hypothesis (H1a) is supported weakly for the decision-making and traditional 
systems, and is supported strongly for the financial incentives system.  
The result in column (2) is consistent with learning about the match between organizational 
capabilities and system requirements. Previous-period changes in performance increase the likelihood of 
switching to a more complex system; past improvements in the firm’s performance seem to be a good 
predictor of the firm’s capabilities and therefore of the decision to adopt a more complex and better-
performing system.  
The estimates on social learning variables suggest that this mechanism has some influence on 
firms’ decisions to adjust their human resource systems. Greater distance from the state’s main 
metropolitan center (Minneapolis) as well as greater distance from other firms (a measure of a firm’s 
degree of isolation) both reduce the likelihood of switching to a more complex system (columns 3 and 4), in 
line with hypothesis H3a, albeit at marginal statistical significance levels.34 Information about the 
distribution of the four systems in general as well as in cells with similar industry, age, size, and location 
has no significant effect on a firm’s likelihood of switching to a more complex system. Information about 
firms’ average performance under the high-performance system increases the likelihood of adopting a more 
complex system, as predicted by hypothesis H3b. However, information about the financial incentives 
system’s performance contradicts this hypothesis, as does (more weakly) information about the decision-
making and traditional systems. Thus, social learning seems to operate most significantly through favorable 
information about the performance effects of the high-performance system, and the better-located firms 
seem to learn to switch to a more complex system more often than their counterparts in faraway places. 
The last two columns of Table 2 examine jointly the three learning mechanisms. Column (7) 
corresponds to social learning variables as specified in column (5), and column (8) corresponds to the 
specification of column (6); for space reasons, we show the results with only one distance variable (to 
Minneapolis).35 The combination of all the variables associated with the three learning mechanisms does 
not reduce their individual effects (except for the distance variable). This suggests that the mechanisms 
have complementary roles in explaining firms’ decisions to switch to a more complex system.  
These results are based on the sample of publicly-traded firms, and the results might not generalize 
to privately-held firms. To investigate this possibility, we replicated the logit estimations from the analysis 
in Table 2 for the full sample including privately-held firms. The results are presented in Appendix Table 
A2. We find that the learning effects we could estimate (learning-by-doing and social learning, since 
matching involves the use of the financial performance measure ROI), are similar in terms of the sign of the 
                                                 
34 The results associated with the total distance from other firms in column (4) should be indicative only of the effect of a firm’s isolation on system 
switching. As mentioned in section II.b and footnote 23, this variable is a weak measure of a firm’s isolation from other firms.  
35 The other distance variable’s effects were similar to those estimated in columns (3) and (4) with slightly weaker significance levels. 
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estimated coefficients. The effects, however, are of smaller magnitude. We also find that the dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm is publicly traded has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood 
of switching to a more complex system. A comparison of average characteristics for the full sample and the 
sample of publicly-traded firms shows that privately-held firms are on average older and smaller, as well as 
located farther away from Minneapolis (see appendix Table A1). These results suggest that privately-held 
firms tend to be more traditional and conservative; they may be less prone to adjustments in their human 
resources system and therefore less sensitive to learning opportunities. 
 
b) Learning Mechanisms by Current System  
  Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the results for learning-by-doing, matching, and social learning, 
respectively. The left panel of each table shows the results of the multinomial analysis for firms with the 
traditional system considering the decision to stay with it or to switch to the decision-making or financial 
incentives system, or to the high-performance system. The right panel shows the results of the logit analysis 
for the decision to stay with or to switch from the decision-making and financial incentives systems into the 
high-performance system.36
Table 3 indicates that there is no significant effect of experience with the traditional system37 on 
the likelihood of switching out of it, neither to the decision-making or financial incentive systems nor to the 
high-performance system.  Consistent with results in Table 2, hypothesis (H1a) is not supported for the 
traditional system. For firms that have already the decision-making or financial incentives system, the 
likelihood of switching to the high-performance system (right panel) is affected significantly by experience 
with each system, with weaker effects for the traditional system and stronger effects for the decision-
making and financial incentives systems. Similar to the results in Table 2, it takes longer (12.5 years) for 
experience with the traditional system to increase the probability of a switch to the high-performance 
system and less for the decision-making and financial incentive systems (2.5 and 3.04 respectively). 
Hypothesis (H1a) is thus strongly supported for experience with the decision-making and financial  
incentive systems. 
Table 4 investigates the matching mechanism. The left panel indicates that past changes in 
performance have no significant effect on the decision to switch out of the traditional system, whereas the 
right panel shows that an increase in past performance affects significantly the decision to switch out of the 
decision-making and financial incentives systems into the high-performance system. These results suggest 
that improvements in past performance serve as a signal of greater capabilities only to firms that have 
                                                 
36 As noted earlier, switches to and from D and F were combined because we do not have information about their relative complexity and because 
the number of observations in each is too small for statistical analysis. There is only one transition from D or F to T, and we combined that 
observation with the observations reflecting no changes in system. 
37 With one exception, all the firms with the traditional system have always had that system, so for those firms, experience with the system 
corresponds to their age. These firms did not have experience with other systems, so the left panel presents estimates only on age cum experience 
with the traditional system. 
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already implemented an intermediate system. The matching results in Tables 4 and 2 are not robust to the 
inclusion of average real wage in the estimations. If average real wage proxies for firm-specific 
heterogeneity, it may capture variations in the capability parameter γj. As a result of its inclusion, there may 
be no more variation left to be explained by past performance changes that are also assumed to reflect firm 
capabilities. Hence our finding that changes in performance signal to management its firm’s capabilities 
seems to hold. 
Table 5 analyzes the effects of social learning variables. The variables associated with distance to 
Minneapolis, total distance from other firms, and total distance from firms with the high-performance 
system have a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of switching out of the traditional system 
into the decision-making and financial incentives systems but not to the high-performance system (columns 
1–3). Interestingly, they increase the likelihood of adopting the decision-making and financial incentives 
systems. This suggests the possibility that distance away from sources of information about how to use the 
high-performance system leads firms to be more cautious and to make adjustments in stages, moving first 
to an intermediate system and only later to the full high-performance system.38  
The distribution of systems in a firm’s own industry (column 4) does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the decision to switch from the traditional system to either the decision-making or 
financial incentives systems or to the high-performance system. However, the performance of firms in a 
firm’s own industry does have an effect on the switch from the traditional to high-performance system but 
not to the intermediate systems. Specifically, the better the average performance of firms using the high-
performance system, the greater the likelihood of switching to the high-performance system, whereas the 
average performance of firms using the financial incentives system reduces the firm’s likelihood of 
switching to the high-performance system. These results imply that firms with the traditional system tend to 
react to the performance of firms with the financial incentives and high-performance systems and switch to 
these systems when performance is favorable. There is no similar effect from the performance of firms with 
the decision-making system, probably because at any point in time, few such firms are in any given firm’s 
environment, as they constitute less than 10% of the sample and probably of all firms, whereas the financial 
incentives and high-performance firms represent more than half the firms for much of the period under 
consideration. A more detailed look at the data, including information about the firm’s location, age, size, 
and industry, as we have done in column (6) of Table 2, was not feasible here (recall that we are controlling 
here for the firm’s current system). 
Firms with the intermediate systems (the right panel in Table 5) do not seem to be influenced in 
their decisions by distance variables, perhaps because the influence of these variables was already exercised 
                                                 
38 The absence of significance for the decision to adopt the full system may also be the result of the small number of transitions from T to H (there 
are just six switches from the traditional system directly into the high-performance system). 
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in the switch from the traditional system to the current system. However, a sizeable effect is measured on 
the performance of firms with the high-performance system, albeit without a lot of precision. 
In summary, the findings of Tables 3, 4, and 5 suggest that learning-by-doing plays a significant 
role in the decision to switch out of both the traditional system and the decision-making and financial 
incentives systems, whereas matching and social learning effects are more or less important depending 
upon which system currently in use. In particular, when it comes to deciding whether to switch to the high-
performance system, firms using the decision-making or financial incentive systems seem to put more 
weight on their own signal about expected capabilities than on information from others. When deciding 
whether to adopt a more complex system, however, firms using the traditional system seem to be 
influenced more by social learning measures. 
 
c) Speed of Learning  
 In order to identify potential determinants of firms’ speed of learning, we estimated hazard models 
for the time to switch to the high-performance system, and to the decision-making or financial incentives 
systems.39 While we previously estimated the importance of specific learning-related variables on the 
likelihood of system adjustments in Tables 2–5, our objective in the following analysis is to estimate the 
effect of particular firm characteristics on the timing of these adjustments. The results are presented in 
Table 6. The comparison of the hazard models based on the log likelihood suggests that the exponential and 
Weibull models might fit better the data. The AIC criterion suggests that the Weibull model is preferred 
over the exponential model.  
The results for the switch to the high-performance system (left panel) show that the firm’s birth 
year negatively affects the hazard, suggesting that younger firms are more likely to adopt sooner than older 
firms. Larger firms and higher-wage firms (firms with higher average real wages when they entered the 
sample) are faster adopters of the high-performance system. Distance from Minneapolis has no significant 
effect on the hazard of adoption of the high-performance system.  
The analysis of the hazard of switching to the decision-making or financial incentives systems 
(right panel) shows similar results for the negative effect of age on the conditional probability of adopting 
the intermediate system. Interestingly, greater distance to Minneapolis increases the hazard into the 
intermediate system, whereas firm size is only weakly significant and not significant under the exponential 
and Weibull hazard models. 
Overall, the hazard analysis suggests that younger firms are faster adopters of both the high-
performance and the intermediate systems. This result is consistent with the previous analysis showing that 
firms with more experience with the traditional system are less likely to adopt a more complex system, 
potentially because of employee resistance or because organizational capabilities necessary to operate more 
                                                 
39 A competing hazards model taking into account all the transitions could not be used due to the small number of observations. 
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complex practices are orthogonal to those learned from accumulated experience under the traditional 
system. This is consistent with the findings in Tables 2 and 3. As expected, larger firms and high-wage 
firms are more likely to be early adopters of the high-performance system. Consistent with the social 
learning findings in Table 5, firms farther away from the metropolitan center are more likely to adopt the 
intermediate systems instead of the full high-performance system.  
 
d) Learning Curve 
Table 7 presents the results of OLS estimations of performance measured as the firm’s returns on 
investment as a quadratic function of a firm’s years of experience. These analyses are conducted for the 
sample of firms that did not experience a change in system, and for observations following the change to a 
new system for those firms that did switch systems.40 The resulting learning curves—predicted profiles 
using these estimates—are illustrated in Figure 5. The coefficients associated with experience with the 
traditional system are not significant, and the learning curve is, of course, flat. The slope coefficients for the 
high-performance profile are significant at the 5% level, and their sign is consistent with a concave learning 
curve as stated in hypothesis (H1b). The coefficients associated with the performance profile of the 
financial incentives system are also significant at the 5% level but not in the expected direction. The 
predicted performance profile is convex with an original decrease in performance and an increase after 
about 11 years of accumulated experience. This conforms with our hypothesis that, in contrast to the high-
performance system, this system is unbalanced and firms that adopt it find it difficult to make it work, 
causing a fall in performance with very slow recovery. The comparison of the performance profiles across 
systems also emphasizes the importance of the matching effect, as the high-performance profile stands 
above the others (hypothesis H1c). 
 
e) Summary of Empirical Results Relative to Theoretical Hypotheses  
We find evidence in favor of hypothesis (H1a) that learning-by-doing increases the likelihood of 
switching to the high-performance system for the decision-making and financial incentive systems after a 
minimum of accumulated experience, but not so for the traditional system. We find strong evidence of 
learning-by-doing effects for firms in the high-performance system, consistent with the learning curve 
hypothesized in (H1b); we do not find evidence of learning from experience for the traditional system, and 
for the financial system we find that the adoption of a new system is associated with a decline in 
productivity. The latter finding suggests that organizational capabilities honed in predecessor systems 
(mostly the traditional one) do not help with running the financial incentives system. This is also consistent 
with hypothesis (H1a) in that accumulated experience with the financial incentives system increases not 
                                                 
40 For the decision-making system there are no observations of non-changers and there are very few observations of changers, so system D was not 
included in this analysis. The results of the analysis with a cubic function of experience are not shown, as the cubic terms were not significant. 
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only organizational capabilities but also the need to switch to a more balanced human resources system. 
The results are also indicative of the importance of matching effects as stated in hypothesis (H1c).  
We find evidence that improvements in performance influence a firm’s decision to change to a 
more complex system, consistent with the matching hypothesis (H2). For social learning, we find some 
evidence for hypothesis (H3a) concerning the effects on learning associated with a firm’s isolation and find 
stronger evidence for hypothesis (H3b) for the impact of the distance to the metropolitan center. There is 
some support for (H3c) and (H3d) related to the role of information on firms’ distribution by system and 
performance within the firm’s own industry; the results are weaker when we use measures based on 
information for firms similar in size, age, and location to the firm under analysis, but this may be due to the 
sensitivity of these measures to the categorization used and the definition of the cells.  
The hypotheses regarding the effect of firm size (positive), firm age (negative), and average wage 
(positive) on the speed of learning are supported. The hypothesis regarding the effect of location (H4c) is 
rejected: distance to the metropolitan center does not hasten adoption of the high-performance system, and 
it is associated with longer time to adoption of the intermediate systems.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 In this paper we examined how firms adjust their human resource systems by investigating what 
information they appear to use in their decision-making. Managers have incomplete information about 
important organizational matters regarding organization structure in general and human resource systems in 
particular: they don’t know their firms’ precise organizational capabilities, they cannot discern precisely the 
role of such capabilities versus the market in determining firm financial performance, and they don’t know 
exactly how other firms are organized and what effect their human resource systems have on performance. 
When they come to make decisions about organizational matters, managers may rely on what they learn 
from various sources: (1) the knowledge derived from experience with certain human resource systems, 
which may allow their firm to either improve performance with the current system or to switch to a more 
complex and better-performing system (the learning-by-doing mechanism), (2) observation of their firm’s 
past performance to understand better its capabilities and assess whether these match the needs of a more 
complex system than the one they already possess (the matching mechanism), and (3) information obtained 
from other sources such as peers and consultants, as well as data about other firms’ behavior and 
performance (the social learning mechanism).  
Drawing on a unique dataset, this paper has thrown light on the three learning mechanisms by 
examining annual decisions that individual firms made over time regarding their human resources system. 
Firms chose to stay with their current human resources system about 90% of the time, whereas the 
adjustments they did make entailed almost always a switch to a more complex system: from the traditional 
system to an intermediate system (financial incentives or decision-making) or (much less frequently) to the 
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high-performance system, or from an intermediate system to the high-performance system. Of course, we 
do not know what information managers actually had at their disposal or used in making their decisions. 
Asking managers who respond to a survey to supply answers about information they or their predecessors 
had when they made the decisions cannot bring out meaningful answers. Instead, we employed the standard 
approach of inferring about the determinants of learning from the degree to which these determinants 
appear to have influenced the object of learning, the choice of human resource systems.  
A sizable literature has investigated the three learning mechanisms in a variety of contexts, often 
concerning the adoption of technology. But this appears to be the first paper to evaluate simultaneously the 
here mechanisms. Perhaps not surprisingly, we found that organizational learning in the context of human 
resource systems is multifaceted and that firms rely on multiple sources of information to make their 
decisions: learning-by-doing, learning about the match, and social learning all play significant roles in 
explaining a firm’s likelihood of switching to a more complex system.  
The accumulation of experience with a given system, i.e., learning by doing, has a twofold effect. 
Initially it entrenches the system, particularly the traditional one, by enhancing a firm’s ability to extract 
value from it. After several years, experience with a system, especially the intermediate ones, improves 
firms’ ability to operate the high-performance system; experience also seems to make firms aware of the 
deficiencies of relying on an unbalanced system and of the advantage of switching to the high-performance 
system to take advantage of the complementarity be financial incentives and decentralized decision-
making.41 These conclusions are supported by the estimated learning curves, which replicate the classic 
learning curve only for the most complex (high-performance) system, but not the other systems. The theory 
that firms learn about their organizational capabilities and assess them relative to the requirements 
associated with more complex systems is supported by the finding that recent improvements in a firm’s 
financial performance relative to its industry provides a signal to managers that their firm’s organizational 
capabilities are suitable for switching to a more complex system and therefore for taking advantage of its 
better performance. This result supports a major tenet of Bayesian learning theory and suggests that 
managers seem to carefully watch their firm’s performance for possibilities to exploit productive 
advantages. Social learning, as reflected in the use of information about the distribution and performance of 
human resource systems among other firms and proximity to the state’s metropolitan center, is an important 
factor in firms’ decision to switch to a more complex system.  
Firms thus behave as if they use both private and public information as well as networking 
opportunities to make decisions about adjustments in their human resource systems. Which source of 
information firms use (their own versus others’) seems to depend on their current system. Interestingly, 
information about a firm’s own performance matters most for switching out of the intermediate systems to 
                                                 
41 Cabral and Leiblein (2001) find that experience with an old semiconductor technology negatively affects the adoption of a new technology but 
their specification does not consider the possibility of a quadratic function of experience. If we analyze experience linearly, we also find significant 
negative effects of experience with simpler systems on the likelihood of switching to a more complex system. Results are available upon request. 
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the high-performance system, whereas information about other firms is more relevant to firms when they 
consider switching out of the traditional system. Our findings are consistent with the possibility that the 
switch from the traditional system into the intermediate systems is often part of a planned subsequent 
switch to the high-performance system. The switch into the intermediate systems of decision-making and 
financial incentives is explained primarily by firms’ geographic location: the closer firms with the 
traditional system are to other firms, to the metropolitan center, or to firms that have the high-performance 
system, the more likely they are to switch. This suggests that social learning about more complex systems is 
important in managers’ decision-making, with some weight attached to their firm’s recent performance. 
However, the switch from the intermediate systems to the high-performance system is based on experience 
with the current system and on performance signals, on the firm’s recent improvements, and on the average 
performance of firms that already have the high-performance system. This two-stage progression of human 
resource systems reveals a fairly cautious and sophisticated learning process, for it seems to reveal use of 
different information sets at different decision junctures. The initial decision to switch out of the traditional 
system is based on social learning, primarily through networks of local knowledge in firms and other 
institutions, with some positive signals about organizational capabilities, whereas the second and final 
switch is based on the receipt of further positive information about a firm’s own organizational capabilities, 
as well as about recent favorable performance of the high-performance system. The transition from one 
system to another is carried out at different speeds by different firms. The firms that switch faster to a more 
complex system are larger, younger, and located closer to the metropolitan center. 
 The geographic location of a firm is an important determinant of its learning. In our single-state 
sample, proximity to the metropolitan center that houses the state’s research university, consulting firms, 
and other institutions that generate and transmit knowledge contributes substantially to a firm’s likelihood 
to adopt more complex human resource systems, and to do so faster. The idea of knowledge passing 
through local networks has support in the literature in various contexts. As Florida (1995) put it, “Learning 
regions function as collectors and repositories of knowledge and ideas, and provide the underlying 
environment or infrastructure which facilitates the flow of knowledge, ideas and learning.” Krugman 
(1991) identified metropolitan areas as centers of specialized knowledge and places where knowledge can 
be transmitted among firms. Other economists found that learning in diverse contexts is affected by 
geography. Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) found that geography is important for citation of 
patents, despite the fact that the patents are in the public domain and available for anyone anywhere to read: 
the citation rate is an inverse function of distance from the location where the patent was discovered. Even 
in the era of fast and essentially costless transmission of information, sophisticated financial traders (whose 
stakes are high) seem to rely more heavily on local word of mouth than on other forms of learning about 
what stocks to trade (Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2005). A fascinating question is why geography is seemingly 
such an important component of learning. Whereas sociologists have long considered social networks and 
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the locations to which these networks are tied very important for understanding social phenomena (Smith-
Doerr and Powell, 2005), only recently have economists come to incorporate these concepts in economic 
analysis. Examination of social learning and the question of whether it is, for certain purposes, more 
efficient than other learning mechanisms may be a fruitful undertaking with important business and policy 
implications. 
 A further natural extension of this paper’s analysis of learning effects on decision adoption would 
be to estimate the comparative benefits of different learning mechanisms in terms of performance. 
Although the small size of our sample makes it difficult to adequately estimate productivity profiles 
combining learning-by-doing and matching effects as in equation (1), we can compare performance 
outcomes of firms before and after a change of system as well as performance outcomes of system 
“changers” versus “non-changers” over the sample period. An analysis of the experience-performance 
profiles (using return on investment) for different subsamples of observations suggests that firms that 
remained under the traditional system throughout the period have flatter experience-performance profiles 
than do firms that remained with the high-performance system. If there is a similar learning curve across 
systems and firms, then this result suggests that traditional firms would stand on the flat part of the curve 
while the high-performance system adopters would be on the steeper part. Matching effects may also imply 
that these results are due to the fact that more efficient firms are also the ones that keep the high-
performance system. Future research should emphasize the performance dynamics of firms following 
different system adjustment paths.  
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Human Resource Systems 
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Figure 2: Classification of Human Resource Systems 
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Figure 3: Optimal Matching of Firm Capabilities and System  
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Figure 4: Productivity Profiles by System Experience 
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Table 1: Patterns of Change (Transitions) in Human Resource Systems 
 
    
   St
St-1
Traditional Financial 
incentives 
Decision- 
making 
High- 
performance 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Traditional 313 
 
87.19 32 8.91 8 2.23 6 1.67 359 100.00 
Financial incentives 0 
 
0.00 226 90.76 0 0.00 23 9.24 249 100.00 
Decision-making  1 
 
2.22 0 0.00 36 80.00 8 17.78 45 100.00 
High-performance  0 
 
0.00 
 
3 
 
1.49 
 
2 
 
0.99 
 
197 
 
97.52 
 
202 
 
100.00 
 
Total 314 
 
36.73 
 
261 
 
30.53 
 
46 
 
5.38 
 
234 
 
27.37 
 
855 
 
100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: St-1 represents the type of human resources system at t-1; St  is the system in t. Observations reflecting no change in the human resources system 
between two consecutive years are presented in grey on the diagonal.
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Table 2: Logit Estimation of Changes to a More Complex System (from T, D, or F to H, or from T to D or F) vs. 
No Change in System or Change to a Less Complex Systema  
Social learning 
Distance from System distribution and 
performance 
Variablesb
 
LBD 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Match-
ing 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Minneapolis 
 
(3) 
All other 
firms 
(4) 
Industry 
 
(5) 
Ind./age/ 
size/cityd
(6) 
          All learning mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
               
             (7)                               (8) 
Experience with system T -0.0012      -0.0017 -0.0013 
 (0.0016)      (0.0014) (0.0015) 
(Experience with system T)2 0.00005*      0.00009* 0.00006* 
 (0.0000)      (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Experience with system F -0.0071**      -0.0073** -0.0053* 
 (0.003)      (0.003) (0.003) 
(Experience with system F)2 0.0006***      0.0007*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0000)      (0.0000) (0.0.000) 
Experience with system D -0.0084      -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.010)      (0.010) (0.011) 
(Experience with system D)2 0.0014**      0.002*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0004)      (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Lagged relative performancec (Change)  0.035**     0.035* 0.037* 
  (0.018)     (0.019) (0.019) 
Distance from Minneapolis (log)   -0.014*    -0.013 -0.010 
   (0.008)    (0.009) (0.009) 
Total distance from other firms (log)    -0.035*     
    (0.022)     
Lagged system distribution         
    Proportion in system F     -0.122 -0.028 -0.071 -0.002 
     (0.282) (0.056) (0.298) (0.053) 
    Proportion in system D     -0.662 -0.107 -0.753* -0.103 
     (0.453) (0.092) (0.426) (0.113) 
    Proportion in system H     -0.193 -0.172 -0.361 -0.128 
     (0.369) (0.192) (0.376) (0.091) 
Lagged average performancec          
    Performance system T     -0.081 -0.011 -0.060 -0.009 
     (0.173) (0.050) (0.160) (0.047) 
    Performance system F     -0.138 -0.180*** -0.136 -0.155*** 
     (0.138) (0.064) (0.137) (0.057) 
    Performance system D     -0.067 -0.065 -0.046 0.022 
     (0.091) (0.043) (0.069) (0.049) 
    Performance system H     0.340** 0.271*** 0.328** 0.233*** 
     (0.155) (0.086) (0.147) (0.085) 
    LR Chi2  
(p-value) 
38.42 
(.000) 
34.16 
(.000) 
30.81 
(.000) 
28.27 
(.003) 
49.02 
(.000) 
52.07 
(.000) 
79.05 
 (.000) 
67.79 
(.003) 
     N 631 631 631 631 631 631 631 631 
                                                     
a The dependent variable is 1 for changing to system H from T, D, or F or to system F from T or to system D from T. The dependent variable is 0 for no change in system or a change to system T from system H, D, or F or to system F 
from H or to system D from H. Note that there are no changes from system D to system F and vice versa. The coefficients reported correspond to marginal effects. Marginal effects were computed following Ai and 
Norton (2003) using procedure ‘predictnl’ in Stata.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Also includes union and industry dummies, a cubic function of lagged firm size, firm age (unless system experience is used), average real wage at entry in the sample, and year. 
c Performance is measured using the firm’s returns on investment, computed relative to average returns in the firm’s industry. 
d Distribution and average performance of firms with similar industry, age, size, and geographic location (city or not) as firmi. 
  
 
 
Table 3: Choice of Human Resources System: Learning-by-Doing 
 
Decisions: Switch out of traditional systema Switch out of decision-making or 
financial incentivesb
 
Variablesc
To systems  
D or F 
To system H To system H 
 
    Firm aged
 
-0.0009 
 
0.0002 
 
. 
 (0.0023) (0.0004)  
    (Firm age)2 0.000 -0.000 . 
 (0.0000) (0.000)  
    Experience with system T . . -0.002** 
   (0.000) 
  (Experience with system T)2 . . 0.00008*** 
   (0.00001) 
    Experience with system F . . -0.014*** 
   (0.001) 
  (Experience with system F)2 . . 0.0023*** 
   (0.001) 
    Experience with system D . . -0.012*** 
   (0.004) 
  (Experience with system D)2 . . 0.0024*** 
   (0.0001) 
LR Chi2 
 (p-value) 
32.74 
 (0.025) 
114.92 
 (0.000) 
     N 784 662 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
a Multinomial estimations such that the base outcome corresponds to no system change.  
b Due to the very small number or absence of observations on changes back to the traditional system (from system H or from systems D or F), the choice 
model in this case is estimated using a logit with two outcomes: no change (in systems D or F) or switch to system H. 
c The estimation includes union and industry dummies, cubic functions of lagged firm size, firm age (unless system experience is used), average real wage 
at entry into the sample, and year. The coefficients correspond to marginal effects. The coefficients correspond to marginal effects (see note a in Table 2). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
d Firm age is equivalent to experience with the traditional system for firms currently in system T.  
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Table 4: Choice of Human Resources System: Matching
 
Decisions: Switch out of traditional systema Switch out of decision-making or 
financial  incentivesb
  
To systems D or F 
 
To system H 
 
Variablesc  To System H 
 
(Relative performance change)T-1
   
               0.027 -0.000 0.040** 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.019) 
LR Chi2 76.42  
(0.000) 
70.20  
 (p-value) (0.000) 
 
    N 359 294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
a Multinomial estimations such that the base outcome corresponds to no organizational system change.   
b Due to the very small number or absence of observations on changes back to the traditional system (from system H or from systems D or F), the choice 
model in this case is estimated using a logit with two outcomes: no changes (in systems D or F) or switch to system H. 
c Performance is measured using the firm’s returns on investment relative to average returns in the firm’s industry. The estimation also includes union and 
industry dummies, cubic functions of lagged firm size, firm age, and year. The coefficients correspond to marginal effects (see note a in Table 2). Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Choice of Human Resources System: Social Learning 
Decisions: Switch from the traditional systema  Switch from D or F to Hb
(1) 
 
(2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Variablesc
To D/F To H To D/F To H To D/F To H To D/F To H 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
Distance from Minneapolis (log) 0.032** 0.000       -0.004    
 (0.015) (0.001)       (0.006)    
Total distance from other firms (log)   0.069* -0.001      -0.013   
   (0.044) (0.004)      (0.018)   
Total distance from system H (log)     0.071* 0.000     -0.013  
     (0.040) (0.003)     (0.018)  
Lagged system distribution             
    Proportion in system F       -0.361 0.003    0.496 
       (0.392) (0.055)    (0.438) 
    Proportion in system D       -0.667 0.079    -0.370 
       (0.706) (0.096)    (0.730) 
    Proportion in system H       -0.218 -0.080    0.085 
       (0.668) (0.141)    (0.529) 
Lagged average performanced             
    Performance system T       0.131 -0.037    -0.156 
       (0.260) (0.048)    (0.169) 
    Performance system F       0.187 -0.052*    -0.145 
       (0.366) (0.032)    (0.143) 
    Performance system D       -0.403 -0.016    -0.057 
       (0.303) (0.054)    (0.086) 
    Performance system H       0.071 0.124*    0.357 
       (0.295) (0.070)    (0.236) 
    LR Chi2  (p-value) 70.10 62.81 64.68 90.10 44.19 44.75 44.66 104.98 
     N 784 784 784  358 662 662 662 294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
a Multinomial estimations such that the base outcome corresponds to no organizational system change.   
b Due to the very small number or absence of observations on changes back to the traditional system (from system H or from systems DM or F), the choice model in this case is estimated using a logit with two 
outcomes: no changes (in systems DM or F) or switch to system H. 
c The estimation includes union and industry dummies, cubic functions of lagged firm size, firm age (unless system experience is used), average real wage at entry in the sample, and year. The cubic terms for 
experience (or age) are not shown for space consideration. When experience (or age) is significant, the cubic term is significant and of the order of 10e-06 or smaller. The coefficients correspond to marginal 
effects (see note a in Table 2).  Robust standard are errors in parentheses. 
d Performance is firm’s returns on investment relative to average returns in the firm’s industry. 
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Table 6: Timing of Human Resources System Change 
Hazard Analysis of Adoption of More Complex Systemsa
 
 
 
‘Failure’ = System H ‘Failure’ = System D or F Variablesb
Cox Exponential Weibull Cox Exponential Weibull 
Union 0.223 0.307 0.351 -0.290 -0.334 -0.331 
                (0.383) (0.384) (0.382) (0.329) (0.331) (0.331) 
Manufacturing 0.458 0.510 0.496 0.034 0.016 0.013 
 (0.364) (0.380) (0.380) (0.273) (0.273) (0.274) 
Service 0.047 0.147 0.105 0.142 0.116 0.118 
 (0.481) (0.477) (0.479) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) 
Firm’s birth year (relative to 1980)c -0.016** -0.015** -0.016** -0.009* -0.008* -0.009* 
               (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm size (log) 0.400*** 0.263*** 0.243*** 0.181* 0.052 0.049 
 (0.004) (0.090) (0.093) (0.103) (0.071) (0.071) 
Distance from Minneapolis (log) 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.242** 0.298** 0.300** 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) (0.121) (0.124) (0.124) 
Average real wage (log)d   0.432* 0.364* 0.422* 0.069 0.101 0.105 
 (0.227) (0.224) (0.224) (0.166) (0.164) (0.164) 
Log likelihood -318.0 -160.2 -156.8 -518.90 -318.0 -229.9 
    LR Chi2  
   (p-value) 
21.50 
(.010) 
18.71 
(.016) 
19.24 
(.013) 
15.88 
(.069) 
15.56 
(.010) 
15.75 
(.046) 
     N 1419 1419 1419 974 974 974 
                                                     
 
a The dependent variable is time to a switch to system H in the left panel and to a switch to systems D or F in the right panel.  
b Also includes a dummy indicating whether the firm is within a 10-mile radius of the center of Minneapolis. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
c This variable is computed as 1980—the year the company was founded. It is therefore an increasing function of firm age. 
d This variable corresponds to average real wages in the company in 1980 or at birth if born after 1980. 
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Table 7: Learning-by-Doing Effectsa
Performance Dynamics for Non-Changers and for Changers After a Change, by System 
 
Dependent Variable: ROI 
 
 
  
Sample of  non-changers and 
observations post-change for 
changersc
Variablesb Sys T Sys H Sys F 
 
Experience with system 
 
-0.0046 
 
0.039** 
 
-0.032** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.014) 
(Experience with system)2 0.000 -0.002* 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.17 0.10 0.11 
N 124 252 223 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted Performance Profiles 
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a The dependent variable is returns on investment.  
b All regressions include a union dummy, year dummies for 1980–1994, industry dummies, and firm size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
c There no observations of non-changers in the decision-making system and too few observations of changers to this system, and therefore the results for system D 
are not shown.  
d Predicted performance profiles using the estimates in Table 7. “Years of experience” reflects the number of years of experience with a given system. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics  
 
 All Firms Public Firms 
Variable Mean Std. Errors Mean 
Std. 
Errors 
Firm characteristics     
Firm age (years in business) 33.91 0.31 28.32 0.97 
Firm size (number of employees) 306.93 17.84 1351.85 141.57 
Publicly traded statue (dummy) 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Unionization (dummy) 0.22 0.00 0.20 0.01 
Manufacturing (dummy) 0.46 0.01 0.71 0.02 
Trade (dummy) 0.35 0.01 0.15 0.01 
Service (dummy) 0.20 0.00 0.14 0.01 
Average real wage (first year in sample) 18044.05 129.21 23485.29 528.74 
Distance to Minneapolis 38.75 0.71 20.96 1.40 
Distance from Other Firms  45524.34 430.19 36141.99 808.90 
Experience with system     
Experience with traditional system  24.90 0.31 20.58 0.87 
Experience with decision-making system  1.61 0.05 1.88 0.14 
Experience with financial incentives system  5.48 0.10 4.34 0.30 
Experience with high-performance system 1.92 0.08 1.52 0.23 
Performance measures     
ROI   .006 .01 
Relative ROI   .072 .01 
Lagged relative ROI level    .079 .01 
Lagged relative ROI change   -.013 .01 
Number of observations 7896  855  
Number of firms 690  110  
 
Sample size – publicly-traded firms 
Table A1 provides summary statistics for the sample with non-missing information on the ROI variable and including “stayers” in 
the high-performance system. The sample size with all observations on firm characteristics including the performance measure 
ROI is 855 observations (110 firms). For the analysis in Table 2, estimating the likelihood of switching to a higher performance 
system, we (1) dropped observations on firms in the high-performance system after a switch to that system throughout the 
remaining of the sample period and also excluded firms that started with the high-performance system and kept it throughout the 
entire period. Given that there is no higher performance system to switch to for these firms, it is logical to drop them from the 
analysis in this case. The sample size drops down to 631 observations. For the analyses in Tables 3 and 5 estimating the 
likelihood of switching out of a given system, the original dataset of 855 observations is further divided into the sample of 
observations on firms with the traditional system potentially switching to a higher performance system (either D, F, or H) which 
contains 784 observations and the sample of firms with either the decision-making system or financial incentives system 
potentially switching to the high-performance system which contains 662 observations. For the analysis in Table 4, these two 
samples drop in size because we use the second lag of changes in the performance for ROI. The hazard analysis in Table 6 is 
based on a larger sample of all publicly-traded firms because this analysis does not require information on performance.  
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Table A2: Logit Estimation of Changes to a More Complex System vs. 
No Change in System or Change to a Less Complex Systema , All Firms 
Social learning 
Distance from System distribution and 
performance 
Variablesb
 
LBD 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Minneapolis 
 
(3) 
All other 
firms 
(4) 
Industry 
 
(5) 
Ind./age/ 
size/cityd
(6) 
          All learning mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
               
             (7)                               (8) 
Public Firm Dummy 0.0172** 0.0196*** 0.0197*** 0.0173** 0.0150 0.0150* 0.010 
 (0.08) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
Experience with system T -0.0003     -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.0002)     (0.0002) (0.0004) 
(Experience with system T)2 0.0000     0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000)     (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Experience with system F -0.0021***     -0.0024*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.0008)     (0.001) (0.002) 
(Experience with system F)2 0.0001***     0.0002** 0.0004** 
 (0.0000)     (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Experience with system D -0.0016     0.002 0.013** 
 (0.0012)     (0.002) (0.006) 
(Experience with system D)2 0.0000     -0.0001 0.000 
 (0.0001)     (0.000) (0.001) 
Distance from Minneapolis (log)  -0.000    -0.002 0.001 
  (0.002)    (0.002 (0.009) 
Total distance from other firms (log)   0.000     
   (0.005)     
Lagged system distribution        
    Proportion in system F    0.010 -0.010 0.022 0.053 
    (0.075) (0.041) (0.074) (0.044) 
    Proportion in system D    0.139 -0.160* -0.128 -0.211*** 
    (0.135) (0.069) (0.134) (0.077) 
    Proportion in system H    0.153 -0.064 0.136 -0.030 
    (0.119) (0.056) (0.118 (0.055) 
Lagged average performancec         
    Performance system T    -0.017 -0.024 -0.008 -0.049 
    (0.049) (0.047) (0.050 (0.043) 
    Performance system F    -0.034 -0.039 -0.024 -0.011 
    (0.045) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) 
    Performance system D    -0.056* -0.015 -0.052* -0.004 
    (0.034) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) 
    Performance system H    0.112** 0.079* 0.095** 0.069* 
    (0.043) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) 
    LR Chi2  
(p-value) 
139.65 
(.000) 
121.48 
(.000) 
121.75 
(.003) 
87.28 
(.000) 
56.01 
(.000) 
100.54 
 (.000) 
92.14 
(.003) 
     N 6554 6554 6554 5154 2161 5154 2161 
 
                                                     
a The dependent variable is 1 for changing to system H from T, D, or F or to system F from T or to system D from T. The dependent variable is 0 for no change in system or a change to system T from system H, D, or F or to system 
F from H or to system D from H. Note that there are no changes from system D to system F and vice versa. The coefficients reported correspond to marginal effects. Marginal effects were computed following Ai and 
Norton (2003) using procedure ‘predictnl’ in Stata.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Also includes union and industry dummies, a cubic function of lagged firm size, firm age (unless system experience is used), average real wage at entry in the sample, and year. 
c Performance is measured using the firm’s returns on investment, computed relative to average returns in the firm’s industry. 
d Distribution and average performance of firms with similar industry, age, ze, and geographic location (city or not) as firmi. 
